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Abstract
Tendermint-core blockchains (e.g. Cosmos) are considered today one of the most viable alter-
natives for the highly energy consuming proof-of-work blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum.
Their particularity is that they aim at offering strong consistency (no forks) in an open system
combining two ingredients (i) a set of validators that generate blocks via a variant of Practical
Byzantine Fault Tolerant (PBFT) consensus protocol and (ii) a selection strategy that dynami-
cally selects nodes to be validators for the next block via a proof-of-stake mechanism. However,
the exact assumptions on the system model under which Tendermint underlying algorithms are
correct and the exact properties Tendermint verifies have never been formally analyzed. The
contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, while formalizing Tendermint algorithms we pre-
cisely characterize the system model and the exact problem solved by Tendermint. We prove
that in eventual synchronous systems a modified version of Tendermint solves (i) under addi-
tional assumptions, a variant of one-shot consensus for the validation of one single block and
(ii) a variant of the repeated consensus problem for multiple blocks. These results hold even if
the set of validators is hit by Byzantine failures, provided that for each one-shot consensus in-
stance less than one third of the validators is Byzantine. Our second contribution relates to the
fairness of the rewarding mechanism. It is common knowledge that in permisionless blockchain
systems the main threat is the tragedy of commons that may yield the system to collapse if the
rewarding mechanism is not adequate. Ad minimum the rewarding mechanism must be fair, i.e.
distributing the rewards in proportion to the merit of participants. We prove, for the first time
in blockchain systems, that in repeated-consensus based blockchains there exists an (eventual)
fair rewarding mechanism if and only if the system is (eventual) synchronous. We also show that
the original Tendermint rewarding is not fair, however, a modification of the original protocol
makes it eventually fair.
1 Introduction
Blockchain is today one of the most appealing technologies since its introduction in the Bitcoin
White Paper [37] in 2008. Blockchain systems, similar to P2P systems in the early 2000, take
their roots in the non academical research. After the releasing of the most popular blockchains
(e.g. Bitcoin [37] or Ethereum [43]) with a specific focus on economical transactions, their huge
potential for various other applications ranging from notary to medical data recording became
evident. In a nutshell, Blockchain systems maintain a continuously-growing history of ordered
information, encapsulated in blocks. Blocks are linked to each other by relying on collision resistant
hash functions, i.e., each block contains the hash of the previous block. The Blockchain itself is a
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distributed data structure replicated among different peers. In order to preserve the chain structure
those peers need to agree on the next block to append in order to avoid forks. The most popular
technique to decide which block will be appended is the proof-of-work mechanism of Dwork and
Naor [18]. The block that will be appended to the blockchain is owned by the node (miner) having
enough CPU power to solve first a crypto-puzzle. The only possible way to solve this puzzle is by
repeated trials. The major criticisms for the proof-of-work approach are as follows: it is assumed
that the honest miners hold a majority of the computational power, the generation of a block is
energetically costly, which yield to the creation of mining pools and finally, multiple blockchains
that coexist in the system due to accidental or intentional forks.
Recently, the non academic research developed alternative solutions to the proof-of-work tech-
nique such as proof-of-stake (the power of block building is proportional to the participant wealth),
proof-of-space (similar to proof-of-work, instead of CPU power the prover has to provide the evi-
dence of a certain amount of space) or proof-of-authority (the power of block building is proportional
to the amount of authority owned in the system). These alternatives received little attention in the
academic research. Among all these alternatives proof-of-stake protocols and in particular those
using variants of Practical Byzantine Fault-Tolerant consensus [10] became recently popular not
only for in-chain transaction systems but also in systems that provide cross-chain transactions.
Tendermint [34, 8, 32, 35] was the first in this line of research having the merit to link the Practical
Byzantine Fault-Tolerant consensus to the proof-of-stake technique and to propose a blockchain
where a dynamic set of validators (subset of the participants) decide on the next block to be ap-
pended to the blockchain. Although, the correctness of the original Tendermint protocol [34, 8, 32]
has never been formally analyzed from the distributed computing perspective, it or slightly modified
variants became recently the core of several popular systems such as Cosmos [33] for cross-chain
transactions.
In this paper we analyse the correctness of the original Tendermint agreement protocol as it
was described in [34, 8, 32] and discussed in [35, 28]. The code of this protocol is available in [42].
One of our fundamental results proved in this paper is as follows:
In an eventual synchronous system, a slightly modified variant of the original Tendermint proto-
col implements the one-shot and repeated consensus, provided that (i) the number of Byzantine
validators, f , is f < n/3 where n is the number of validators participating in each single one-shot
consensus instance and (ii) eventually a proposed value will be accepted by at least 2n/3+1 processes
(Theorem 7 and Theorem 11).
More in detail, we prove that the original Tendermint verifies the consensus termination with
a small twist in the algorithm (a refinement of the timeout) and with the additional assumption
stating that there exists eventually a proposer such that its proposed value will be accepted, or
voted, by more than two-third of validators.
We are further interested in the fairness of Tendermint-core blockchains because without a
glimpse of fairness in the way rewards are distributed, these blockchains may collapse. Our fairness
study, in line with Francez definition of fairness [23], generally defines the fairness of protocols based
on voting committees (e.g. Byzcoin[31], PeerCensus[14], RedBelly [12], SBFT [25] and Hyperledger
Fabric [3] etc), by the fairness of their selection mechanism and the fairness of their reward mecha-
nism. The selection mechanism is in charge of selecting the subset of processes that will participate
to the agreement on the next block to be appended to the blockchain, while the reward mechanism
defines the way the rewards are distributed among processes that participate in the agreement. The
analysis of the reward mechanism allowed to establish our second fundamental result with respect
2
to the fairness of repeated-consensus blockchains as follows:
There exists a(n) (eventual) fair reward mechanism for repeated-consensus blockchains if and only
if the system is (eventual) synchronous (Theorem 16).
Moreover, we show that even in an eventual synchronous setting, the original Tendermint pro-
tocol is not eventually fair, however with a small twist in the way delays and commit messages are
handled it becomes eventually fair.
Note that our work is the first to analyze the fairness of protocols based on voting committees
elected by selection mechanisms as proof-of-stake.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related works are discussed in Section 2. Section
3 defines the model and the formal specifications of one-shot and repeated consensus. Section
4 formalizes the original Tendermint protocol through pseudo-code and proves the correctness of
the One-Shot Consensus anf the Repeated Consensus algorithms. In Section 5 we present a full
descriptions of the counter-example that motivates the modification of the original algorithm and
the additioinal assumptions needed for the correctness. Section 6 discusses the necessary and
sufficient conditions for a protocol based on repeated consensus to achieve a fair rewarding.
2 Related Work
Interestingly, only recently distributed computing academic scholars focus their attention on the
theoretical aspects of blockchains motivated mainly by the intriguing claim of popular blockchains,
as Bitcoin and Ethereum, that they implement consensus in an asynchronous dynamic open system.
This claim is refuted by the famous impossibility result in distributing computing [22].
In distributed systems, the theoretical studies of proof-of-work based blockchains have been
pioneered by Garay et al [24]. Garay et al. decorticate the pseudo-code of Bitcoin and analyse
its agreement aspects considering a synchronous round-based communication model. This study
has been extended by Pass et al. [38] to round based systems where messages sent in a round can
be received later. In order to overcome the drawbacks of Bitcoin, [20] proposes a mix between
proof-of-work blockchains and proof-of-work free blockchains referred as Bitcoin-NG. Bitcoin-NG
inherits the drawbacks of Bitcoin: costly proof-of-work process, forks, no guarantee that a leader
in an epoch is unique, no guarantee that the leader does not change the history at will if it is
corrupted.
On another line of research Decker et al. [14] propose the PeerCensus system that targets
linearizability of transactions. PeerCensus combines the proof-of-work blockchain and the classi-
cal results in Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant agreement area. PeerCensus suffers the same
drawbacks as Bitcoin and Byzcoin against dynamic adversaries.
Byzcoin [31] builds on top of Practical Byzantine Fault-Tolerant consensus [10] enhanced with
a scalable collective signing process. [31] is based on a leader-based consensus over a group of
members chosen by a proof-of-membership mechanism. When a miner succeeds to mine a block, it
gains a membership share, and the miners with the highest shares are part of the fixed size voting
member set. In the same spirit, SBFT [25] and Hyperledger Fabric [3] build on top of [10].
In order to avoid some of the previously cited problems, Micali [36] introduced (further extended
in [6, 11]) sortition based blockchains, where the proof-of-work mechanism is completely replaced
by a probabilistic ingredient.
The only academic work that addresses the consensus in proof-of-stake based blockchains is
authored by Daian et al. [13], which proposes a protocol for weakly synchronous networks. The
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execution of the protocol is organized in epochs. Similar to Bitcoin-NG [20] in each epoch a different
committee is elected and inside the elected committee a leader will be chosen. The leader is allowed
to extend the new blockchain. The protocol is validated via simulations and only partial proofs
of correctness are provided. Ouroboros [29] proposes a sortition based proof-of-stake protocol and
addresses mainly the security aspects of the proposed protocol. Red Belly [12] focuses on consortium
blockchains, where only a predefined subset of processes are allowed to append blocks, and proposes
a Byzantine consensus protocol.
Interestingly, none of the previous academic studies made the connection between the repeated
consensus specification [5, 16, 15] and the repeated agreement process in blockchain systems. More-
over, in terms of fairness of rewards, no academic study has been conducted related to blockchains
based on repeated consensus.
The closest works in blockchain systems to our fairness study (however very different in its
scope) study the chain-quality. In [24], Garay et al. define the notion of chain-quality as the
proportion of blocks mined by honest miners in any given window and study the conditions under
which the ratio of blocks in the chain mined by malicious players over the total number of blocks
in a given window is bounded. Kiayias et al. in [29] propose Ouroboros [29] and also analyse the
chain-quality property. Pass et al. address in [39] one of the vulnerabilities of Bitcoin studied
formally in Eyal and Sirer [21]. In [21] the authors prove that if the adversary controls a coalition
of miners holding even a minority of the computational power, this coalition can gain twice its
share. Fruitchain [39] overcomes this problem by ensuring that no coalition controlling less than
a majority of the computational power can gain more than a factor 1 + 3δ by not respecting the
protocol, where δ is a parameter of the protocol. In [19], Eyal analyses the consequences of attacks
in systems where pools of miners can infiltrate each other and shows that in such systems there is
an equilibrium where all pools earn less than if there were no attack. In [26], Guerraoui and Wang
study the effect of message propagation delays in Bitcoin and show that, in a system of two miners,
a miner can take advantage of the delays and be rewarded exponentially more than its expectation.
In [27], Gu¨rcan et al. study the fairness from the point of view of users that do not participate to
the mining. A similar work is done by Herlihy and Moir in [28] where the authors study the users
fairness and consider as an example the original Tendermint [34, 8, 32]. The authors discussed how
processes with malicious behaviour can violate fairness by choosing transactions, then they propose
modifications to the original Tendermint to make those violations detectable and accountable.
3 System model and Problem Definition
The system is composed of an infinite set Π of asynchronous sequential processes, namely Π =
{p1, . . . }; i is called the index of pi. Asynchronous means that each process proceeds at it own
speed, which can vary with time and remains unknown to the other processes. Sequential means
that a process executes one step at a time. This does not prevent it from executing several threads
with an appropriate multiplexing. As local processing time are negligible with respect to message
transfer delays, they are considered as being equal to zero.
Arrival model. We assume a finite arrival model [1], i.e. the system has infinitely many
processes but each run has only finitely many. The size of the set Πρ ⊂ Π of processes that
participate in each system run is not a priori-known. We also consider a finite subset V ⊆ Πρ of
validators. The set V may change during any system run and its size n is a-priori known. A process
is promoted in V based on a so-called merit parameter, which can model for instance its stake in
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proof-of-stake blockchains. Note that in the current Tendermint implementation, it is a separate
module included in the Cosmos project [33] that is in charge of implementing the selection of V .
Communication network. The processes communicate by exchanging messages through an
eventually synchronous network [17]. Eventually Synchronous means that after a finite unknown
time τ there is a bound δ on the message transfer delay.
Failure model. There is no bound on processes that can exhibit a Byzantine behaviour [40] in
the system, but up to f validators can exhibit a Byzantine behaviour at each point of the execution.
A Byzantine process is a process that behaves arbitrarily: it can crash, fail to send or receive
messages, send arbitrary messages, start in an arbitrary state, perform arbitrary state transition,
etc. Byzantine processes can control the network by modifying the order in which messages are
received, but they cannot postpone forever message receptions. Moreover, Byzantine processes can
collude to “pollute” the computation (e.g., by sending messages with the same content, while they
should send messages with distinct content if they were non-faulty). A process (or validator) that
exhibits a Byzantine behaviour is called faulty. Otherwise, it is non-faulty or correct or honest. To
be able to solve the consensus problem, we assume that f < n/3.
Communication primitives. In the following we assume the presence of a broadcast primitive.
A process pi broadcasts a message by invoking the primitive broadcast(〈TAG,m〉), where TAG is
the type of the message, and m its content. To simplify the presentation, it is assumed that a
process can send messages to itself. The primitive broadcast() is a best effort broadcast, which
means that when a correct process broadcasts a value, eventually all the correct processes deliver
it. A process pi receives a message by executing the primitive delivery(). Messages are created with
a digital signature, and we assume that digital signatures cannot be forged. When a process pi
delivers a message, it knows the process pj that created the message.
Let us note that the assumed broadcast primitive in an open dynamic network can be im-
plemented through gossiping, i.e. each process sends the message to current neighbors in the
underlying dynamic network graph. In these settings the finite arrival model is a necessary condi-
tion for the system to show eventual synchrony. Intuitively, a finite arrival implies that message
losses due to topology changes are bounded, so that the propagation delay of a message between
two processes not directly connected can be bounded [4].
Problem definition. In this paper we analyze the correctness of Tendermint protocol against
two abstractions in distributed systems: consensus and repeated consensus defined formally as
follows.
Definition 3.1 (One-Shot Consensus). We say that an algorithm implements One-Shot Consensus
if and only if it satisfies the following properties:
• Termination. Every correct process eventually decides some value.
• Integrity. No correct process decides twice.
• Agreement. If there is a correct process that decides a value B, then eventually all the
correct processes decide B.
• Validity[12]. A decided value is valid, it satisfies the predefined predicate denoted isValid().
The concept of multi-consensus is presented in [5], where the authors assume that only the
faulty processes can postpone the decision of correct processes. In addition, the consensus is made
a finite number of times. The long-lived consensus presented in [16] studies the consensus when
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the inputs are changing over the time, their specification aims at studying in which condition the
decisions of correct process do not change over time. None of these specifications is appropriate for
blockchain systems. In [15], Delporte-Gallet et al. defined the Repeated Consensus as an infinite
sequence of One-Shot Consensus instances, where the inputs values may be completely different
from one instance to another, but where all the correct processes have the same infinite sequence
of decisions. We consider a variant of the repeated consensus problem as defined in [15]. The main
difference is that we do not predicate on the faulty processes. Each correct process outputs an
infinite sequence of decisions. We call that sequence the output of the process.
Definition 3.2 (Repeated Consensus). An algorithm implements a repeated consensus if and only
if it satisfies the following properties:
• Termination. Every correct process has an infinite output.
• Agreement. If the ith value of the output of a correct process is B, then B is the ith value
of the output of any other correct process.
• Validity. Each value in the output of any correct process is valid, it satisfies the predefined
predicate denoted isValid().
4 Tendermint Formalization
4.1 Informal description of Tendermint and its blockchain
Tendermint protocol [34, 8] aims at building a blockchain without forks relying on a variant of PBFT
consensus. When building the blockchain, a subset of fixed size n of processes called validators
should agree on the next block to append to the blockchain. The set of validators is deterministically
determined by the current content of the blockchain, referred as the history. We note that this
subset may change once a block is appended. The mechanism to choose the validators from a
given history is further referred as selection mechanism. Note that in the current Tendermint
implementation, it is a separate module included in the Cosmos project [33] that is in charge of
implementing the selection mechanism. Intuitively, such mechanism should be based on the proof-
of-stake approach but its actual implementation is currently left open. Let us recall that Tendermint
agreement protocol relies on the assumption that the selection mechanism, for each block, selects
up to f Byzantine processes from the current history.
The first block of Tendermint blockchain, called the genesis block, is at height 0. The height of
a block is the distance that separates that block to the genesis block. Each block contains: (i) a
Header which contains a pointer to the previous block and the height of the block, (ii) the Data
which is a list of transactions, and (iii) a set LastCommit which is the set of validators that signed
on the previous block. Except the first block, each block refers to the previous block in the chain.
Given a current height of Tendermint blockchain, a total ordered set of validators V is selected to
add a new block. The validators start a One-Shot Consensus algorithm. The first validator creates
and proposes a block B, then if more than 2n/3 of the validators accept B, B will be appended as
the next block, otherwise the next validator proposes a block, and the mechanism is repeated until
more than 2n/3 of the validators accept a block. For each height of Tendermint blockchain, the
mechanism to append a new block is the same, only the set of validators may change. Therefore,
Tendermint applies a Repeated Consensus algorithm to build a blockchain, and at each height, it
relies on a One-Shot Consensus algorithm to decide the block to be appended.
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Although the choice of validators is managed by a separate module (see Cosmos project [33]) the
rewards for the validators that contributed to the block at some specific height H are determined
during the construction of the block at height H + 1. The validators for H that get a reward for
H are the ones that validators for H + 1 “saw” when proposing a block. This mechanism can be
unfair, since some validator for H may be slow, and its messages may not reach the validators
involved in H + 1, implying that it may not get the rewards it deserved.
4.2 Tendermint One-Shot Consensus algorithm
Tendermint One-Shot Consensus algorithm is a round-based algorithm used to decide on the next
block for a given height H. In each round there is a different proposer that proposes a block to
the validators that try to decide on that block. A round consists of three steps: (i) the Propose
step, the proposer of the round broadcasts a proposal for a block; (ii) the Prevote step, validators
broadcast their prevotes depending on the proposal they delivered during the previous step; and
(iii) the Precommit step, validators broadcast their precommits depending on the occurrences of
prevotes for the same block they delivered during the previous step. To preserve liveness, steps have
a timeout associated, so that each validator moves from one step to another either if the timeout
expires or if it delivers enough messages of a particular typology. When pi broadcasts a message
(〈TAG,m〉), m contains a block B along with other information. We say that pi prevotes (resp.
precommits) on B if TAG = PREVOTE (resp. TAG=PRECOMMIT). In Figure 2 is depicted the state
machine for Tendermint Consensus.
To preserve safety, when a validator delivers more than 2n/3 prevotes for B then it “locks” on
such block. Informally, it means that there are at least n/3+1 prevotes for B from correct processes,
then B is a possible candidate for a decision so that validators try to stick on that. More formally,
a validator has a Proof-of-LoCk (PoLC) for a block B (resp. for nil) at a round r for the height H
if it received at least 2n/3 + 1 prevotes for B (resp. for nil). In this case we say that a process is
locked on such block. A PoLC-Round (PoLCR) is a round such that there was a PoLC for a block
at round PoLCR. In Figure 3 the state machine concerning the process of locking and unlocking
on a block B is shown. On the edges are reported the conditions on the delivered messages that
have to be met in order to lock or unlock on a block. Intuitively, when a process delivers 2n/3 of
the same message B of type prevote when in a precommit step, it locks on B. A process unlocks
a block only if it delivers 2n/3 of a value B′ or when it commits. When a process is locked on a
block B, it does not send any value different than B. This mechanism is necessary to ensure the
safety of the protocol and to satisfy the Agreement property stated in Section 3.
Preamble. Note that our analysis of the original Tendermint protocol [34, 8, 32] led to the
conclusion that several modifications are needed in order to implement One-Shot Consensus prob-
lem. Full description of these bugs in the original Tendermint protocol are reported in Section
5. In more details, with respect to the original Tendermint, our Tendermint One-shot Consensus
algorithm (see Figure 1) has the following modifications. We added line 29 in order to catch up
the communication delay during the synchronous periods. Moreover, we modified the line 19 in
order to guarantee the agreement property of One-Shot Consensus (defined in Section 3). The
correctness of Tendermint One-shot Consensus algorithm needs an additional assumption stating
that eventually a proposal is accepted by a majority of correct processes. This assumption, stated
formally in Theorem 7, is necessary to guarantee the termination.
Variables and data structures. r and PoLCRi are integers representing the current round
and the PolCR. lockedBlock i is the last block on which pi is locked, if it is equal to a block B, we
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Function consensus(H,Π, signature); %One-Shot Consensus for the super-round H with the set Π of processes%
Init:
(1) r ← 0; LLRi ← −1; PoLCRi ← ⊥; lockedBlock i ← nil; B ← ⊥;
(2) TimeOutPropose ← ∆Propose; TimeOutPrevote ← ∆Prevote;
(3) proposalReceivedH,ri ← ⊥; prevotesReceived
H,r
i ← ⊥; precommitsReceived
H,r
i ← ⊥;
———————————————————————————————————————————————–
while (true) do
(4) r ← r + 1; PoLCRi ← ⊥;
————————————————————Propose step r ————————————————————
(5) if (pi == proposer(H, r)) then
(6) if (LLRi 6= −1) then PoLCRi ← LLRi; B ← lockedBlock i;
(7) else B ← createNewBlock(signature);
(8) endif
(9) trigger broadcast 〈PROPOSE, (B,H, r,PoLCRi)i〉;
(10) else
(11) set timerProposer to TimeOutPropose ;
(12) wait until ((timerProposer expired) ∨ (proposalReceivedH,r
′
i 6= ⊥));
(13) if ((timerProposer expired) ∧ (proposalReceivedH,r
′
i == ⊥)) then
(14) TimeOutPropose ← TimeOutPropose + 1;
(15) endif
(16)endif
————————————————————Prevote step r ————————————————————
(17) if ((PoLCRi 6= ⊥) ∧ (LLRi 6= −1) ∧ (LLRi < PoLCRi < r)) then
(18) wait until |prevotesReceivedH,PoLCRi | > 2n/3;
(19) if (∃B′ : (is23Maj(B′, prevotesReceivedH,PoLCRii )) ∧ (B
′ 6= lockedBlock i)) then lockedBlock i ← nil; endif
(20)endif
(21) if (lockedBlock i 6= nil) then trigger broadcast 〈PREVOTE, (lockedBlock i, H, r)i〉;
(22) else if (isValid(proposalReceivedH,ri )) then trigger broadcast 〈PREVOTE, (proposalReceived
H,r
i , H, r)i〉; endif
(23) else trigger broadcast 〈PREVOTE, (nil, H, r)i〉;
(24)endif
(25)wait until ((is23Maj(nil, prevotesReceivedH,ri )) ∨ (∃B
′′ : (is23Maj(B′′, prevotesReceivedH,ri )))∨
(|prevotesReceivedH,ri | > 2n/3)); %Delivery of any 2n/3 prevotes for the round r%
(26) if (¬(is23Maj(nil, prevotesReceivedH,ri )) ∧ ¬(∃B
′′ : (is23Maj(B′′, prevotesReceivedH,ri )))) then
(27) set timerPrevote to TimeOutPrevote;
(28) wait until (timerPrevote expired);
(29) if (timerPrevote expired) then TimeOutPrevote ← TimeOutPrevote + 1; endif
————————————————————Precommit step r ——————————————————–
(30) if (∃B′ : (is23Maj(B′, prevotesReceivedH,ri ))) then
(31) lockedBlock i ← B′;
(32) trigger broadcast 〈PRECOMMIT, (B′,H, r)i〉;
(33) LLRi ← r;
(34) else if (is23Maj(nil, prevotesReceivedH,r
i
)) then
(35) lockedBlock i ← nil; LLRi ← −1;
(36) trigger broadcast 〈PRECOMMIT, (nil,H, r)i〉;
(37) endif
(38) else trigger broadcast 〈PRECOMMIT, (nil,H, r)i〉);
(39)endif
(40)wait until ((is23Maj(nil, prevotesReceivedH,ri )) ∨ (|precommitsReceived
H,r
i | > 2n/3))
endwhile
Figure 1: First part of Tendermint One-shot Consensus algorithm at correct process pi.
say that pi is locked on B, otherwise it is equal to nil, and we say that pi is not locked. When
lockedBlock i 6= nil and switch the value to nil, then pi unlocks. Last-Locked-Round (LLRi) is an
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upon event delivery 〈PROPOSE, (B′, H, r′,PoLCRj)j〉:
(41) if (proposalReceivedH,r
′
i = ⊥) then
(42) proposalReceivedH,r
′
i ← (B
′,H, r′)j ;
(43) PoLCRi ← PoLCRj ;
(44) trigger broadcast 〈PROPOSE, (B′,H, r′,PoLCRj)j〉;
(45)endif
————————————————————————————————————
upon event delivery 〈PREVOTE, (B′, H, r′,LLR)j〉:
(46) if ((B′, H, r′,LLR)j /∈ prevotesReceived
H,r′
i ) then
(47) prevotesReceivedH,r
′
i ← prevotesReceived
H,r′
i ∪ (B
′, H, r′,LLR)j ;
(48) trigger broadcast 〈PREVOTE, (B′,H, r′,LLR)j〉;
(49) if ((r < r′) and (|prevotesReceivedH,r
′
i | > 2/3)) then
(50) r ← r′;
(51) goto Prevote step r;
(52) endif
(53)endif
————————————————————————————————————
upon event delivery 〈PRECOMMIT, (B′,H, r′)j〉:
(54) if ((B′, H, r′)j /∈ precommitsReceived
H,r′
i ) then
(55) precommitsReceivedH,r
′
i ← precommitsReceived
H,r′
i ∪ (B
′,H, r′)j ;
(56) trigger broadcast 〈PRECOMMIT, (B′, H, r′)j〉;
(57) if ((r < r′) and (|precommitsReceivedH,r
′
i | > 2/3)) then
(58) r ← r′;
(59) goto Precommit step r;
(60) endif
(61)endif
————————————————————————————————————
when (∃B′ : is23Maj(B′, precommitsReceivedH,r
′
i )):
(62)return B’;%Terminate the consensus for the super-round H by deciding B′%
Figure 1: Second part of Tendermint One-shot Consensus algorithm at correct process pi.
integer representing the last round where pi locked on a block. B is the block the process created.
Each validator manages timeouts, TimeOutPropose and TimeOutPrevote, concerning the pro-
pose and prevote phases respectively. Those timeouts are set to ∆Propose and ∆Prevote and started
at the beginning of the respective step. Both are incremented if they expire before the validator
moves to the next step.
Each validator manages three sets for the messages delivered. In particular, the set proposalReceivedH,ri
contains the proposal that pi delivered for the round r at height H. prevotesReceived
H,r
i is the set
containing all the prevotes pi delivered for the round r at height H. precommitsReceived
H,r
i is the
set containing all the precommits pi delivered for the round r at height H.
Functions. We denote by Block the set containing all blocks, and by MemPool the structure
containing all the transactions.
• proposer : V ×Height×Round→ V is a deterministic function which gives the proposer out
of the validators for a given round at a given height in a round robin fashion.
• createNewBlock : 2Π ×MemPool → Block is an application-dependent function which creates
a valid block (w.r.t. the application), where the subset of processes is a parameter of the
One-Shot Consensus, and is the subset of processes that send a commit for the block at the
previous height, called the signature of the previous block.
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New Height
(H=H+1)
Propose
(H,r=r+1)
Prevote
(H,r)
Precommit
(H,r)
Commit
(H)
lines 5 - 16 lines 17 - 29 lines 30 - 40
TimeOutProposeexpired ∨
Propose(B,PolCR) delivered
More than 2n/3 Prevote(B) ∨
More than 2n/3 Prevote(nil) ∨
TimeOutPrevoteexpired ∨
More than 2n/3 of any Prevote(-)
More than
2n/3 Precommit(B)
More than 2n/3 Prevote(nil) ∨
TimeOutPrecommit expired ∨
More than 2n/3 of any Precommit(-)
Figure 2: State Machine for Tendermint One-Shot algorithm described in Figure 1. For ease of
readability, common exit conditions are represented.
∃B :
lock(B)
lock(nil)
More than 2n/3 Prevote(nil) ∨
(PROPOSE(B’,PolCR) delivered ∧ isValid(B’) ∧ PolCR 6= ⊥)∨
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B
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More than 2n/3 Prevote(B)
∄
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Figure 3: State machine Lock/Unlock
• is23Maj : (Block∪nil)× (prevotesReceived ∪ precommitsReceived )→ Bool is a predicate that
checks if there is at least 2n/3 + 1 of prevotes or precommits on the given block or nil in the
given set.
• isValid : Block → Bool is an application dependent predicate that is satisfied if the given block
is valid. If there is a block B such that isValid(B) = true, we say that B is valid. We note
that for any non-block, we set isValid to false, (e.g. isValid(⊥) = false).
Detailed description of the algorithm. In Figure 1 we describe Tendermint One-Shot algorithm
to solve the One-Shot Consensus (defined in Section 3) for a given height H.
For each round r at height H the algorithm proceeds in 3 phases:
1. Propose step (lines 5 - 16): If pi is the proposer of the round and it is not locked on any
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block, then it creates a valid proposal and broadcasts it. Otherwise it broadcasts the block
it is locked on. If pi is not the proposer then it waits for the proposal from the proposer. pi
sets the timer to T imeOutProposal, if the timer expires before the delivery of the proposal
then pi increases the time-out, otherwise it stores the proposal in proposalReceived
H,r
i . In any
case, pi goes to the Prevote step.
2. Prevote step (lines 17 - 29): If pi delivers the proposal during the Propose step, then it
checks the data on the proposal. If lockedBlock i 6= nil, and pi delivers a proposal with a valid
PoLCR then it unlocks. After that check, if pi is still locked on a block, then it prevotes on
lockedBlock i; otherwise it checks if the block B in the proposal is valid or not, if B is valid,
then it prevotes B, otherwise it prevotes on nil. Then pi waits until |prevotesReceived
H,r
i | >
2n/3. If there is no PoLC for a block or for nil for the round r, then pi sets the timer to
TimeOutPrevote, waits for the timer’s expiration and increases TimeOutPrevote. In any case,
pi goes to Precommit step.
3. Precommit step (lines 30 - 40): pi checks if there was a PolC for a particular block or nil
during the round (lines 30 and 34). There are three cases: (i) if there is a PoLC for a block B,
then it locks on B, and precommits on B (lines 30 - 32); (ii) if there is a PoLC for nil, then it
unlocks and precommits on nil (lines 34 - 36); (iii) otherwise, it precommits on nil (line 38); in
any case, pi waits until |precommitsReceived
H,r
i | > 2n/3 or (is23Maj(nil, prevotesReceived
H,r
i )),
and it goes to the next round.
Whenever pi delivers a message, it broadcasts it (lines 44, 48 and 56). Moreover, during a round
r, some conditions may be verified after a delivery of some messages and either (i) pi decides and
terminates or (ii) pi goes to the round r
′ (with r′ > r). The conditions are:
• For any round r′, if for a block B, is23Maj(B, precommitsReceivedH,r
′
i ) = true , then pi decides
the block B and terminates, or
• If pi is in the round r at height H and |prevotesReceived
H,r′
i | > 2n/3 where r
′ > r, then it
goes to the Prevote step for the round r′, or
• If pi is in the round r at height H and |precommitsReceived
H,r′
i | > 2n/3 where r
′ > r, then it
goes to the Precommit step for the round r′.
4.3 Correctness of Tendermint One-Shot Consensus
In this section we prove the correctness of Tendermint One-Shot Consensus algorithm (Fig. 1) for
a height H under the assumption that during the synchronous period there exists eventually a
proposer such that its proposed value will be accepted by at least 2n/3 + 1 processes.
Lemma 1 (One-Shot Integrity). In an eventual synchronous system, Tendermint One-Shot Con-
sensus Algorithm verifies the following property: No correct process decides twice.
Proof The proof follows by construction. A correct process decides when it returns (line 62).
Lemma 1
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Lemma 2 (One-Shot Validity). In an eventual synchronous system, Tendermint One-Shot Consen-
sus Algorithm verifies the following property: A decided value is valid, if it satisfies the predefined
predicate denoted isValid().
Proof
Let pi be a correct process, we assume that there exists a value B, such that pi decides B. We
show by construction that if pi decides on a value B, then B is valid.
If pi decides B, then is23Maj(B, precommitsReceived
H,r
i ) = true (line 62), since the signature of
the messages are unforgeable and f < n/3 by hypothesis, then more than n/3 of those precommits
for round r are from correct processes. This means that for each of those correct processes pj,
is23Maj(B, prevotesReceivedH,rj ) = true (lines 30 - 32), and thus at least n/3 of those prevotes are
from correct processes.
Let pj be one of the correct processes which prevoted on B during the round r. pj prevotes on
a value B during a round r in two cases: Case a, during r, pj is not locked on any value or Case b:
pj is already locked on B and does not checks its validity (lines 21 - 24).
• Case a: If pj is not locked on any value than before prevoting it checks the validity of B and
prevotes on B if B is valid (line 22);
• Case b: If pj was locked on B, it did not check the validity of B, it means that pj was locked
on B during the round r; which means that there was a round r′ < r such that pj had a
PoLC for B for the round r′ (lines 30 - 32), by the same argument, there is a round which
happened before r′ where pj was locked or B is valid.
Since a process locked during a round smaller than the current one, and that there exists a
first round where all correct processes are not locked (line 1), there is a round r′′ < r′ where
pj was not locked on B but prevoted B, as in Case a, pj checks if B is valid and then prevotes
on B if B is valid (lines 22).
A value prevoted by a correct process is thus valid. Therefore a decided value by a correct process
is valid since more than n/3 correct processes prevote that value. Lemma 2
Lemma 3. In an eventual synchronous system, Tendermint One-Shot Consensus Algorithm verifies
the following property: If f +1 correct processes locked on the same value B during a round r then
no correct process can lock during round r′ > r on a value B′ 6= B.
Proof We assume that f + 1 correct processes are locked on the same value B during the round
r, and we denote by Xr the set of those processes. We first prove by induction that no process in
Xr will unlock or lock on a new value. Let let pi ∈ X
r.
• Initialization: round r + 1. At the beginning of round r + 1, all processes in Xr are locked
on B. Moreover, we have that LLRi = r, since pi locks on round r (line 31). Let pj be the
proposer for round r+1. If LLRj = r, it means that pj is also locked on B, since there cannot
be a value B′ 6= B such that is23Maj(B, prevotesReceivedH,rj ) = true, for that to happen, at
least n/3 processes should prevote both B and B′ during round r, which means that at least
a correct process prevoted two times in the same round, which is not possible, since it is
correct, and the protocol does not allow to vote two times in the same round (lines 17 - 29).
Three cases can then happen:
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– pj locked on a value Bj during the round LLRj ≤ r. This means that during the round
LLRj is23Maj(Bj, prevotesReceived
H,LLRj
j ) = true (line 31). pj the proposer proposes a
value Bj along with LLRj (lines 5 - 9). Since LLRj ≤ LLRi = r, pi does not unlock and
prevotes B for the round r + 1, and so are all the other processes in Xr (lines 17 - 21).
The only value that can have more than 2n/3 prevotes is then B. So pi is still locked on
B at the end of r + 1.
– If pj is not locked, the value it proposes cannot unlock processes in X
r because −1 =
LLRj < r, and they will prevote on B (lines 17 - 21). The only value that can have
more than 2n/3 prevotes is then B. So pi is still locked on B at the end of r + 1.
– pj locked on a value Bj during the round LLRj > r, pj the proposer proposes a value
Bj along with LLRj (lines 5 - 9). Since LLRj ≥ r + 1, pi does not unlock and prevotes
B for the round r+1, and so are all the other processes in Xr (lines 17 - 21). The only
value that can have more than 2n/3 prevotes is then B. So pi is still locked on B at the
end of r + 1.
At the end of round r + 1, all processes in Xr are still locked on B and it may happen that
other processes are locked on B for round r + 1 at the end of the round.
• Induction: We assume that for a given a > 0, the processes in Xr are still locked on B at
each round between r and r + a. We now prove that the processes in Xr will still be locked
on B at round r + a+ 1.
Let pj be the proposer for round r + a+ 1. Since the f + 1 processes in X
r were locked on
B for all the rounds between r and r+ a, no new value can have more than 2n/3 of prevotes
during one of those rounds, so ∄B′ 6= B : is23Maj(B′, prevotesReceived
H,rj
j ) = true where
r < rj < r + a + 1. Moreover, if pj proposed the value B along with a LLR > r, since the
processes in Xr are already locked on B, they do not unlock and prevote B (lines 17 - 21).
The proof then follows as in the Initialization case.
Therefore all processes in Xr will stay locked on B at each round after round r. Since f +1 pro-
cesses will stay locked on the value B on rounds r′ > r, they will only prevote on B (lines 17 - 21) for
each new round. Let B′ be a value, we have that ∀r′ ≥ r if B′ : is23Maj(B′, prevotesReceivedH,r
′
j ) =
true then B′ = B.
Lemma 3
Lemma 4 (One-Shot Agreement). In an eventual synchronous system, Tendermint One-Shot Con-
sensus Algorithm verifies the following property: If there is a correct process that decides a value
B, then eventually all the correct processes decide B.
Proof Let pi be a correct process. Without loss of generality, we assume that pi is the first correct
process to decide, and it decides B at round r. If pi decides B, then is23Maj(B, precommitsReceived
H,r
i ) =
true (line 62), since the signature of the messages are unforgeable by hypothesis and f < n/3, then
pi delivers more than n/3 of those precommits for round r from correct processes, and those correct
process are locked on B at round r (line 31). pi broadcasts all the precommits it delivers (line
56), so eventually all correct processes will deliver those precommits, because of the best effort
broadcast guarantees.
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We now show that before delivering the precommits from pi, the other correct processes can-
not decide a different value than B. f < n/3 by hypothesis, so we have that at least f + 1
correct processes are locked on B for the round r. By Lemma 3 no correct process can lock
on a value different than B. Let B′ 6= B, since correct processes lock only when they pre-
commit (lines 30 - 32), no correct process will precommit on B′ for a round bigger than r, so
is23Maj(B′, precommitsReceivedH,r
′
i ) = false for all r
′ ≥ r since no correct process will precommit
on B′. No correct process cannot decide a value B′ 6= B (line 62) once pi decided. Eventually, all
the correct processes will deliver the 2n/3 signed precommits pi delivered and broadcasted, thanks
to the best effort broadcast guarantees and then will decide B. Lemma 4
Lemma 5. In an eventual synchronous system, and under the assumption that during the syn-
chronous period eventually there is a correct proposer pk such that |{pj : LLRk ≤ LLRj and pj is correct}| <
n/3− f , Tendermint One-Shot Consensus Algorithm verifies the following property: Eventually a
correct process decides.
Proof Let r be the round where the communication becomes synchronous and when all the messages
broadcasted by correct processes are delivered by the correct processes within their respective step.
The round r exists, since the system is eventually synchronous and correct processes increase their
time-outs when they did not deliver enough messages (lines 13 - 15, 26 - 29 and 40). If a correct
process decides before r, that ends the proof. Otherwise no correct process decided yet. Let pi
be the proposer for the round r. We assume that pi is correct. Let B be the value such that pi
proposes (B,LLRi), we have three cases:
• Case 1: No correct process is locked on a value before r. ∀pj ∈ Π such that pj is correct,
LLRj = −1.
Correct processes delivered the proposal (B,LLRi) before the Prevote step (lines 12, 42 - 44).
Since the proposal is valid, then all correct processes will prevote on that value (line 22), and
they deliver the others’ prevotes and broadcast them before entering the Precommit step (lines
25 - 29 and 48). Then for all correct process pj , we have is23Maj(B, precommitsReceived
H,r
j ) =
true. The correct processes will lock onB, precommit on B (lines 30 - 32) and will broadcast all
precommits delivered (line 56). Eventually a correct process pj will have is23Maj(B, precommitsReceived
H,r
j ) =
true then pj will decide (line 62).
• Case 2: Some correct processes are locked and if pj is a correct process, LLRj < LLRi.
Since LLRj < LLRi for all correct processes pj, then the correct processes that are locked
will unlock (line 19) and the proof follows as in the Case 1.
• Case 3: Some correct processes are locked on a value, and there exist a correct process pj
such that LLRi ≤ LLRj .
– (i) If |{pj : LLRi ≤ LLRj and pj is correct}| < n/3− f (which means that even without
the correct processes that are locked in a higher round than the proposer pi, there are
more than 2n/3 other correct processes unlock or locked in a smaller round than LLRi),
then as in the case 2, a correct process will decide.
– (ii) If |{pj : LLRi ≤ LLRj and pj is correct}| ≥ n/3− f , then during the round r, ∄B
′ :
is23Maj(B′, precommitsReceivedH,ri ) = true, in fact correct processes only precommit
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once in a round (lines 30 - 40). Eventually, thanks to the additional assumption, there
exists a round r1 where the proposer pk is correct and at round r1, |{pj : LLRk ≤
LLRj and pj is correct}| < n/3− f . The proof then follows as case (3.i).
If pi is Byzantine and more than n/3 correct processes delivered the same message during the
proposal step, and the proposal is valid, the situation is like pi was correct. Otherwise, there are
not enough correct processes that delivered the proposal, or if the proposal is not valid, then there
will be less than n/3 processes that will prevote that value. No value will be committed. Since the
proposer is selected in a round robin fashion, a correct process will eventually be the proposer, and
a correct process will decide. Lemma 5
Lemma 6 (One-Shot Termination). In an eventual synchronous system, and under the assumption
that during the synchronous period eventually there is a correct proposer pk such that |{pj :
LLRk ≤ LLRj and pj is correct}| < n/3 − f , Tendermint One-Shot Consensus Algorithm verifies
the following property: Every correct process eventually decides some value.
Proof By construction, if a correct process does not deliver a proposal during the proposal step
or enough prevotes during the Prevote step, then that process increases its time-outs (lines 13 - 15
and 26 - 29), so eventually, during the synchrony period of the system, all the correct processes
will deliver the proposal and the prevotes from correct processes respectively during the Propose
and the Prevote step. By Lemma 5, a correct process decides a value, and then by the Lemma 4,
every correct process eventually decides. Lemma 6
Theorem 7. In an eventual synchronous system, and under the assumption that during the syn-
chronous periods eventually there is a correct proposer pk such that |{pj : LLRk ≤ LLRj and pj is correct}| <
n/3− f : Tendermint One-Shot Algorithm implements the One-Shot Consensus.
Proof The proof follows directly from Lemmas 1, 2, 4 and 6. Theorem 7
4.4 Tendermint Repeated Consensus algorithm
For a given height, the set V of validators does not change. Note that each height corresponds to
a block. Therefore, in the following we refer this set as the set of validators for a block.
Data structures. The integer H is the height where is called a One-Shot Consensus instance.
V is the current set of validators. B is the block to be appended. commitsReceivedHi is the set
containing all the commits pi delivered for the height H. toReward
H
i is the set containing the
validators from which pi delivered commits for the height H. TimeOutCommit represents the time
a validator has for collecting commits after an instance of consensus. TimeOutCommit is set to
∆Commit.
Functions.
• validatorSet : Π×Height → 2Π is an application dependent and deterministic selection function
which gives the set of validators for a given height w.r.t the blockchain history. We have
∀H ∈ Height , |validatorSet(H)| = n.
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Function repeatedConsensus(Π); %Repeated Consensus for the set Π of processes%
Init:
(1) H ← 1 %Height%; B ← ⊥; V ← ⊥ %Set of validators%;
(2) commitsReceivedHi ← ∅; toReward
H
i ← ∅; TimeOutCommit ← ∆Commit;
—————————————————————————————————————
while (true) do
(3) B ← ⊥;
(4) V ← validatorSet(H); %Application and blockchain dependant%
(5) if (pi ∈ V ) then
(6) B ← consensus(H, V, toRewardH−1i ); %Consensus function for the height H%
(7) trigger broadcast 〈COMMIT, (B,H)i〉;
(8) else
(9) wait until (∃B′ : |atLeastOneThird(B′, commitsReceivedHi )|);
(10) B ← B′;
(11)endif
(12) set timerCommit to TimeOutCommit ;
(13)wait until(timerCommit expired);
(14) trigger decide(B);
(15)H ← H + 1;
endwhile
—————————————————————————————————————
upon event delivery 〈COMMIT, (B′,H′)j〉:
(16) if (((B′, H′)j /∈ commitsReceived
H′
i ) ∧ (pj ∈ validatorSet(H
′))) then
(17) commitsReceivedH
′
i ← commitsReceived
H′
i ∪ (B
′, H′)j ;
(18) toRewardH
′
i ← toReward
H′
i ∪ pj ;
(19) trigger broadcast 〈COMMIT, (B′, H′)j〉;
(20)endif
Figure 4: Tendermint Repeated Consensus algorithm at correct process pi.
• consensus : Height × 2Π × commitsReceived → Block is the One-Shot Consensus instance
presented in 4.2.
• createNewBlock : 2Π ×MemPool → Block is the application-dependent function that creates
a valid block (w.r.t. the application) from the One-Shot Consensus.
• atLeastOneThird : Block × commitsReceived → Bool is a predicate which checks if there is at
least n/3 of commits of the given block in the given set.
• isValid : Block → Bool is the same predicate as in the One-shot Consensus, which checks if a
block is valid or not.
Detailed description of the algorithm. In Fig. 4 we describe the algorithm to solve the
Repeated Consensus as defined in Section 3. The algorithm proceeds as follows:
• pi computes the set of validators for the current height;
• If pi is a validator, then it calls the consensus function solving the consensus for the current
height, then broadcasts the decision, and sets B to that decision;
• Otherwise, if pi is not a validator, it waits for at least n/3 commits from the same block and
sets B to that block;
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• In any case, it sets the timer to TimeOutCommit for receiving more commits and lets it
expire. Then pi decides B and goes to the next height.
Whenever pi delivers a commit, it broadcasts it (lines 16 - 20). Note that the reward for the height
H is given during the height H + 1, and to a subset of validators who committed the block for H
(line 6).
4.5 Correctness of Tendermint Repeated Consensus
In this section we prove the correctness of Tendermint Repeated Consensus algorithm in Figure 4.
We now show that Tendermint Repeated Algorithm (Fig. 4) implements the Repeated Consensus.
Lemma 8 (Repeated Termination). In an eventual synchronous system, and under the additional
assumption that during the synchronous period eventually there is a correct proposer pk such that
|{pj : LLRk ≤ LLRj and pj is correct}| < n/3 − f , Tendermint Repeated Consensus Algorithm
verifies the following property: Every correct process has an infinite output.
Proof By contradiction, let pi be a correct process, and we assume that pi has a finite output. Two
scenarios are possible, either pi cannot go to a new height, or from a certain height H it outputs
only ⊥.
• If pi cannot progress, one of the following cases is satisfied:
– The function consensus() does not terminate (line 6), which is a contradiction due to
Lemma 6; or
– pi waits an infinite time for receiving enough commits (line 9), which cannot be the case
because of the best effort broadcast guarantees and the eventual synchronous assumption,
all the correct validators terminate the One-Shot Consensus and broadcast their commit.
• If pi decides at each height (line 14), it means that from a certain height H, pi only outputs
⊥. That means that: (i) either pi is a validator for H and the function consensus(H
′) is only
returning ⊥ for all H ′ ≥ H (lines 5 and 6), or (ii) pi is not a validator for H but delivered at
least n/3 commits for ⊥ (lines 9 and 19).
– (i): Since consensus() returns the value ⊥, that means by Lemma 2 that isValid(⊥) = true,
which is a contradiction with the definition of the function isValid().
– (ii): Since only the validators commit, and each of them broadcasts its commit (lines 5 -
7), and because f < n/3, it means that pi delivered a commit from at least one correct
validator (process). By Lemma 2, correct processes only decide/commit on valid value,
and ⊥ is not valid, which is a contradiction.
We conclude that if pi is a correct process, then it has an infinite output. Lemma 8
Lemma 9 (Repeated Agreement). In an eventual synchronous system, Tendermint Repeated Con-
sensus Algorithm verifies the following property: If the ith value of the output of a correct process
is B, then B is the ith value of the output of any other correct process.
Proof We prove this lemma by construction. Let pj and pk be two correct processes. Two cases
are possible:
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• pj and pk are validators for the height i, so they call the function consensus() (lines 5 and 6).
By Lemma 4 pj and pk decide the same value and then output that same value (line 14).
• At least one of pj and pk is not a validator for the height i. Without loss of generality, we
assume that pj is not a validator for the height i. Since all the correct validators commit the
same value, let say B, thanks to Lemma 4, and since they broadcast their commit (line 7),
eventually there will be more than 2n/3 of commits for B. So no other value B′ 6= B can
be present at least n/3 times in the set commitReceivedHi . So pj outputs the same value B
as all the correct validators (line 9). If pk is a validator, that ends the proof. If pk is not a
validator, then by the same argument as for pj , pk outputs the same value B. Hence pj and
pk both output the same value B.
Lemma 9
Lemma 10 (Repeated Validity). In an eventual synchronous system, Tendermint Repeated Con-
sensus Algorithm verifies the following property: Each value in the output of any correct process
is valid, it satisfies the predefined predicate denoted isValid().
Proof We prove this lemma by construction. Let pi be a correct process, and we assume that
the Hth value of the output of pi is B. If pi decides a value (line 14), then that value has been set
during the execution and for that height (line 3).
• If pi is a validator for the height H, then B is the value returned by the function consensus(),
by the Lemma 2 we have that isValid(B) = true.
• If pj is not a validator for the height H, it means that it delivered more than n/3 signed
commits from the validators for the value B (lines 5 - 7 and 16 - 20), hence at least one
correct validator committed B, and by Lemma 2 we have that isValid(B) = true.
So each value that a correct process outputs satisfies the predicate isValid(). Lemma 10
Theorem 11. In an eventual synchronous system, Tendermint Repeated Consensus algorithm
implements the Repeated Consensus. In an eventual synchronous system, and under the additional
assumption that during the synchronous period eventually there is a correct proposer pk such that
|{pj : LLRk ≤ LLRj and pj is correct}| < n/3 − f , Tendermint Repeated Consensus algorithm
implements the repeated consensus.
Proof The proof follows directly from Lemmas 8, 9 and 10. we showed that Tendermint protocol
satisfies respectively the Termination property, the Agreement property and the Validity property.
Theorem 11
5 Bugs in the original Tendermint
5.1 Addition of line 29 on Fig. 1
The line 29 allows the correct process pi to increase its time-out to catch up the communication
delay in the network. If the correct processes never increase their TimeOutPrevote, even when the
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system becomes synchronous, the correct process may never deliver enough prevotes at time. Thus
it can never precommit. To decide, a correct process needs more than 2n/3 precommits for the same
value for the same round (and so more that n/3 precommits from correct processes) to decide (line
62), no correct process ever decides, which does not satisfies the One-Shot Termination property.
When a process increases its TimeOutPrevotewhenever it does not deliver enough messages, it will
eventually catch-up the delay, and during the synchronous period, there will be a time from when
it will deliver prevotes from all correct processes.
5.2 Modification of line 19 on Fig. 1
Originally, the line 19 was
if(∃B′ : (is23Maj(B′, prevotesReceivedH,PoLCRii )) then lockedBlock i ← nil; endif
In that version, it is possible that if a process pi is locked on a value B during a round r, a process
locked on the same value B during a round r′ > r makes pi unlock, but does not ensure that pi
locks again. That is a problem since it causes a violation of the Agreement property.
In the following, we exhibit a problematic scenario. Assume that there are 4 processes in the
network. 3 correct processes p1, p2, p3 and a Byzantine process p4.
1. Round 1: p1 is the proposer and proposes B. All process deliver the proposal and prevote on
B from round 1.
p1 and p2 deliver all prevotes for B, and then lock and precommit on B.
p1 delivers the precommit of p1, p2 and from p4 for Band then it decides B. Neither p2 and
p3 delivers enough precommit to decide.
The state is: p1 decides B and left. p2 is locked on (B, 1), p3 is not locked, p4 is Byzantine
so we do not say anything about its state.
2. Round 2: p1 exit, and do not take part any more. p2 and p3 do not deliver the precommit
for B.
p2 is the proposer. Since p2 is locked on B, it proposes B along with 1 where it locked. p2
and p3 deliver the proposal. p2 does not unlock since it locked at round 1 and prevote on B.
p3 is not locked, but since it delivered the proposal, it prevotes on B. p4 sends a prevote on
B only to p3 such that p3 delivers all the prevotes during this step but not p2, so during the
precommit step, p3 locked on B but for the round 2.
The state is: p1 already decided. p2 is locked on (B, 1), p3 is locked on (B, 2), p4 is Byzantine
so we do not say anything about its state.
3. Round 3: p2 and p3 do not deliver the precommit for B from round 1.
p3 is the proposer. Since p3 is locked on B, it proposes B along with 2 where it locked. p2
and p3 deliver the proposal. p2 unlocks since it receives 2 but was locked at 1 and prevote the
proposal B. p3 does not unlock since it locked exactly at round 1 and prevote on B. p4 sends
a prevote on B such that p3 delivers all the prevotes during its step but not p2, so during the
precommit step, p3 locked on B but for the round 2.
The state is: p1 already decided B. p2 is not locked, p3 is locked on (B, 2), p4 is Byzantine
so we do not say anything about its state.
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4. Round 4: p2 and p3 do not deliver the precommit for B from round 1.
p4 is the proposer and proposes (B, 3). p2 is not locked, but since it delivered the proposal,
it prevotes on B. p3 unlocks since it receives 3 but was locked at 2 and prevote the proposal
B. p4 does nothing. Neither p2 nor p3 delivers enough prevotes to lock.
The state is: p1 already decided B. p2 is not locked, p3 is not locked, p4 is Byzantine so we
do not say anything about its state.
5. Round 5: p2 and p3 do not deliver the precommit for B from round 1.
p1 is the proposer but since it left, there is no proposal. p2 and p3 are not locked and did not
deliver a proposal so they prevote on nil. p4 does nothing. Neither p2 nor p3 delivers enough
prevotes to lock.
The state is: p1 already decided B. p2 is not locked, p3 is not locked, p4 is Byzantine so we
do not say anything about its state.
6. Round 4: p2 and p3 do not deliver the precommit for B from round 1.
p2 is the proposer. Since it is not locked, it proposes a new value B
′. p2 and p3 deliver the
proposal before their respective prevote step. p2 and p3 are not locked and did deliver the
proposal B′, so they prevote on B′. p4 sends prevote B
′ to both p2 and p3.
p2 and p3 deliver the 3 prevotes before entering the precommit step, and hence locked on B
′
and precommit on B, and p4 also send precommit to p2.
p2 delivers precommit from p2, p3 and p4 and thus it decides B
′.
The state is: p1 already decided B. p2 decides B
′, p3 is locked on B
′, p4 is Byzantine so we
do not say anything about its state.
At the end of the round 4, p1 and p2 decide on two different values, which does not satisfy the
One-Shot Agreement property.
5.3 Counter-example for the One-Shot Termination without the additional as-
sumption
We recall the additional assumption : eventually there is a correct proposer pk such that |{pj :
LLRk ≤ LLRj and pj is correct}| < n/3− f .
In [9] the authors advocate without providing any evidence that there is a livelock problem
in Tendermint description proposed in the Buchman’s manuscript [8]. Hereafter, we exhibit this
evidence. We thank anonymous reviewers of the preliminary version of this work appeared as
technical report [2] to point us the scenario below.
We consider a system of 4 processes, p1 to p4, where p4 is a Byzantine process. The round number
1 has p1 as a proposer, and we assume that it happens before the system is synchronous (before
GST in DLS terminology [17]), and only p1 locks value v1 in this round (lockedBlock = v1, LLR = 1
at p1, and for other processes equal to initial values. PoLCR = ⊥ for p1, p2, and p3 (p4 is faulty so
we don’t talk about it’s state).
Starting with round number 2, all rounds happen during synchronous period (after GST), so
communication between correct processes is reliable and timely, i.e., all correct processes receive
messages from all correct processes. Note that during synchronous period we don’t have the same
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guarantee on messages sent by Byzantine processes, i.e., a Byzantine process can send a message
only to a subset of correct processes on time so it is delivered in the current round, and although
a message is eventually delivered by all correct processes, it might not be delivered by all correct
processes in the round r in which it is sent.
1. In round 2, p2 proposes (v2,⊥), where B = v2, and PoLCR = ⊥ as p2 hasn’t locked any value.
p1 rejects this proposal and Prevote v1 as it has v1 locked in round 1 (condition at line 17
evaluates to false as upon receipt of Proposal all correct processes set PoLCR to ⊥). p2 and
p3 accept the proposal and prevote v2, but as p4 stay silent, no process locks a value in round
2. So at the end of round 2, we have the following state: lockedBlock = v1,LLR = 1 at p1,
and for other processes equal to initial values (lockedBlock = nil and LLR = ⊥) PoLCR = ⊥
at p1, p2, and p3 (p4 is faulty so we don’t talk about it’s state).
2. In round 3, p3 proposes (v3,⊥) as it hasn’t locked any value. p1 rejects this proposal and
prevote v1 as it has v1 locked in round 1 (condition at line 17 evaluates to false as upon
receipt of Proposal all correct processes set PoLCR to ⊥). p2 and p3 accept the proposal and
prevote v3, but p4 sends Prevote message for v3 only to p3. Furthermore, p4 sends Prevote v3
message to p3 just before timerPrevote expires at p3, and after timerPrevote expired at p1
and p2, and they moved to round 4. So although Prevote messages that are received by p3 are
propagated to other processes, they will be received by p1 and p2 after they moved to round
4. So in the round 3 only p3 locks v3. At the end of the round 3, lockedBlock = v1,LLR = 1
at p1, lockedBlock = v3,LLR = 3 at p3, lockedBlock = nil,LLR = ⊥ at p2, and PoLCR = ⊥
for p1, p2, and p3 (p4 is faulty so we don’t talk about it’s state).
3. In round 4, p4 is a proposer and as it is Byzantine process we assume it stays silent, so nothing
change.
4. In round 5, p1 proposes (v1, 1). p3 rejects this proposal and prevote v3 as it has v3 locked in
round 3, therefore the condition at line 17 evaluates to false as LLR = 3 and PoLCR = 1 at
p3. p1 and p2 accept the proposal, and prevote v1. p4 sends Prevote message for v1 only to
p1 just before timerPrevote expires at p1 and after timerPrevote expires at p2 and p3. So
p2 and p3 receives Prevote from p4 from round 5 only after they moved to round 6. So in
the round 5 only p1 locks v1. At the end of the round 5, lockedBlock = v1,LLR = 5 at p1,
lockedBlock = v3,LLR = 3 at p3, lockedBlock = nil,LLR = ⊥ at p2, and PoLCR = 1 for p1,
p2, and p3 (p4 is faulty so we don’t talk about it’s state).
5. In round 6, p2 proposes (v2, 1) as it hasn’t locked any value. p1 rejects this proposal and
prevote v1 as it has v1 locked in round 5. p3 rejects the proposal and prevote v3 as it has
locked v3 in round 3, and p4 stays silent, so no process lock a value in round 2. At the
end of the round 6, lockedBlock = v1,LLR = 5 at p1, lockedBlock = v3,LLR = 3 at p3,
lockedBlock = nil,LLR = ⊥ at p2, and PoLCR = 1 for p1, p2, and p3 (p4 is faulty so we don’t
talk about it’s state).
6. In round 7, p3 proposes (v3, 3). p1 rejects this proposal and prevote v1 as it has v1 locked in
round 5. p2 and p3 accept the proposal and prevote v3, and p4 sends Prevote message for v3
only to p3, just before timerPrevote expires at p3 and after timerPrevote expires at p1 and
p2, and after they moved to round 8. So similar as above in the round 7 only p3 locks v3. At
the end of the round 7, lockedBlock = v1,LLR = 5 at p1, lockedBlock = v3,LLR = 7 at p3,
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lockedBlock = nil,LLR = ⊥ at p2, and PoLCR = 3 for p1, p2, and p3 (p4 is faulty so we don’t
talk about it’s state).
This scenario repeats forever, so the algorithm never terminates, which violates the One-Shot
Termination property. This scenario cannot repeat forever with the additional assumption that
during the synchronous period eventually there is a correct proposer pk such that |{pj : LLRk ≤
LLRj and pj is correct}| < n/3− f .
Let us call that assumption assumption T .
Assumption T vs. Symmetric Byzantine : Symmetric Byzantine processes [30] are processes
that behave arbitrarily, but their behaviour is perceived the same by all correct processes. We
note that in our case; the assumption of Symmetric Byzantine is stronger than the assumption T .
In fact the Symmetric Byzantine assumption restrict the Byzantine behaviour during the whole
execution of the algorithm, whereas the assumption T requires that eventually, during an interval
of one round of the execution after the synchronous period, Byzantine processes behaviour do not
impact at least 2n/3 correct processes.
6 Tendermint Fairness
Recently Pass and Shi defined the fairness of a Proof-of-Work based blockchain protocol for a system
of n processes as follows (please refer to [39] for the formal definition): A blockchain protocol is fair
if honest process that wield φ fraction of the computational resources will reap at least φ fraction of
the blocks in any sufficiently long window of the chain, where the computational resources represent
the merit of the process. We note that in their model, a block in the blockchain was created by only
one process, and that process gets a reward for the created block. We extend the definition of [39]
for a system with an infinite number of processes, and where each block is produced by a subset
of processes. This is the case of Tendermint for example where for each block there is a subset of
processes called the validators that produce that block. The correct validators for a block (those
that followed the protocol and participated in the agreement process) are the processes that have
to be rewarded for that block. Informally, we say that a blockchain protocol is fair if any correct
process (a process that followed the protocol) that wield φ fraction of the total merit in the system
will get more or less φ fraction of the total reward that is given in the system. In order to study
the fairness of a protocol in a consensus-based blockchain such as Tendermint, Redbelly, SBFT or
Hyperledger Fabric, we split the protocol in two mechanisms: (i) the selection mechanism which
selects for each new height the validators (the processes that will run the consensus instance) for
that height taking into account the merit of each process, and (ii) the reward mechanism, which is
the mechanism giving rewards to correct validators that decided on the new block. Informally, if
the selection mechanism is fair, then every process will become validator proportionally to its merit
parameter; and if the reward mechanism is fair then for each height only the correct validators get
a reward. By combining the two mechanisms, a correct process gets rewarded at least a number
proportional to its merit parameter, since the faulty processes do not get any reward.
We define the following properties for characterizing the fairness of a reward mechanism. For
each height, each validator has a boolean variable which we call a reward parameter.
1. For each block in the blockchain, all correct validators for that block have a reward parameter
equal to 1,
22
2. For each block in the blockchain, all faulty validators and the processes that are not validators
should have a reward parameter for that block equal to 0.
3. A process gets a reward for a block if and only if it has a reward parameter for that block
equal to 1.
3’. There exists a height H such that for a block in the blockchain at height H ′ > H a process
gets a reward for that block if and only if it has a reward parameter for that block equal to
1.
Definition 6.1 (Fairness of a reward mechanism). A reward mechanism is fair if it satisfies the
conditions 1, 2 and 3.
Definition 6.2 (Eventual fairness of a reward mechanism). A reward mechanism is eventually fair
if it satisfies the conditions 1, 2 and 3’.
Definition 6.3 ((Eventual) Fairness of a blockchain protocol). A blockchain protocol is fair (resp.
eventually fair) if it has a fair selection mechanism and a fair (resp. eventually fair) reward mech-
anism.
6.1 Tendermint’s Reward Mechanism
The validators selection mechanism is part of a separate module of Cosmos project [33], which
has Tendermint as core-blockchain. The selection mechanism is today left configurable by the
application, therefore in the following we do not address this part. The rewarding mechanism, on
the other hand, referred as the Tendermint’s reward mechanism is part of the original Tendermint
protocol and it is reported in Figure 4 at lines 13 and 16 - 20. Tendermint’s reward mechanism
works as follows:
• Once a new block is decided for height H, processes wait for TimeOutCommit time to collect
the decision from the other validators for H, and put them in their set toReward (Fig. 4,
lines 13 and 16 - 20).
• During the consensus at height H, let us assume that pi proposes the block that will get
decided in the consensus. pi proposes to reward processes in its set toReward (Fig. 4, line 6).
That is, only the processes from which pi delivered a commit will get a reward for the block
at height H − 1.
Lemma 12. The reward mechanism of Tendermint is not eventually fair.
Proof We assume that the system becomes synchronous, and that TimeOutCommit < ∆, where
∆ is the maximum message delay in the network. For any height H, let pi be a validator for the
height H−1 and pj the validator whose proposal get decided for the height H. It may happen that
pj did not receive the commit from pi before proposing its block. Hence when the block is decided,
pi does not get a reward for its effort, which contradicts the condition 3’ of the reward mechanism
fairness. Tendermint’s reward mechanism is not eventually fair. Lemma 12
Let us observe that to make Tendermint’s reward mechanism at least eventually fair it is neces-
sary to increase TimeOutCommit for each round until it catches up the message delay. We refer to
this variant as the Tendermint’s reward mechanism with modulable timeouts. Moreover, the commit
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message should contain enough information to keep track of process participation in each phase, in
order to exclude from the reward a process that did not send a propose or vote message but that
sends a commit because he is aware about the block produced. This scenario can be avoided, for
instance, by including in the toReward variable a process pi only if f +1 commit messages contain
the process pi.
Lemma 13. When the commit messages are sufficient to detect a process that did not send
expected messages, Tendermint’s reward mechanism with modulable timeouts is eventually fair.
Proof We change the reward mechanism in Tendermint as follows:
• Once a new block is decided, say for height H, processes wait for at most TimeOutCommit
to collect the decision from the other validators for that height, and put them in their set
toReward .
• If a process did not get the commits from all the validators for that height before the expiration
of the time-out, it increases the time-out for the next height.
• During the consensus at height H, let us assume that pi proposes the block that will get
decided in the consensus. pi gives the reward to the processes in its toReward .
In this reward mechanism, TimeOutCommit is increased whenever a process does not have the
time to deliver all the commits for the previous round. We prove that this reward mechanism is
eventually fair.
There is a point in time t from when the system will become synchronous, and all the commits
will be delivered by correct processes before the next height. From the time t, at height H all correct
processes know the exact set of validators that committed the block from H − 1, and from those
commit messages, they can exclude the set of processes that did not participate to the consensus,
and they give to those validators from H − 1 a reward parameter greater than 0. The validators
in H give the reward to the correct validators that committed and which are the only one with a
reward parameter greater than 0 for H − 1, which satisfy the fairness conditions 1, 2 and 3’, so the
reward mechanism presented is eventually fair. Lemma 13
Theorem 14. In an eventual synchronous system, if the selection mechanism is fair, and from the
commit messages processes can differentiate correct and Byzantine behaviour, then Tendermint
Repeated Consensus with the reward mechanism with modulable time-outs, is eventually fair.
Proof The proof follows by Lemma 13. Theorem 14
6.2 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for a Fair Reward Mechanism
In this section, we discuss the consequences of the synchrony on the existence of a fair reward in
Repeated Consensus based blockchain protocols where the blockchain is constructed by a mecha-
nism of repeated consensus. That is, at each height, a subset of processes called validators produce
a block executing an instance of One-Shot Consensus.
Theorem 15. There exists a fair reward mechanism in a Repeated Consensus based blockchain
protocol iff the system is synchronous.
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Proof We prove this theorem by double implication.
• If the system is synchronous, then there exists a fair reward mechanism.
We assume that the system is synchronous and all messages are delivered before the x following
blocks. We consider the following reward mechanism. For all the correct validators at any
height H, if H − x ≤ 0, do not reward yet, otherwise:
– Set to 1 the reward parameters of all correct validators in H − x, and to 0 the merit
parameters of the others.
– Reward only the validators with a reward parameter equal to 1 from the height H − x.
We prove in the following that the above reward mechanism is fair.
Note that the system is synchronous and messages sent are delivered within at most x blocks.
Therefore, the exact set of correct validators at H −x is known by all at H. By construction,
the validators in H exactly give the reward to the correct validators who are the only one
with a reward parameter for H − x greater than 0, which satisfies the fairness conditions (1,
2 and 3).
• If there exists a fair reward mechanism, then the system is synchronous.
By contradiction, we assume that P is a protocol having a fair reward mechanism and that, the
system is not synchronous. We say that the validators following P are the correct validators.
Let V i be a set of validators for the height i, and V j, (j > i) be the set of validators who
gave the reward to the correct validators in V i. Since the system is not synchronous, the
validators in V j may not receive all messages from V i before giving the reward.
By conditions 1, and 2, it follows that all and only the correct validators in V i have a reward
parameter greater than 0. Since the reward mechanism is fair, with the condition 3, we have
the validators in V j gave the reward only to the correct validators in V i. That means that
the correct validators in V j know exactly who were the correct validators in V i, so they got
all the messages before giving the reward. Contradiction, which conclude the proof.
Theorem 15
If there is no synchrony, then there cannot be a fair consensus based protocol for blockchain.
The fairness we define states that every time during the execution, the system is fair, so if a process
leaves the system, it receives all rewards it deserves for the time it was in the system.
Theorem 16. There exists an eventual fair reward mechanism in a Repeated Consensus based
blockchain protocol iff the system is eventually synchronous or synchronous.
Proof We proof this result by double implication.
• If the system is eventually synchronous or synchronous, then there exists an eventual fair
reward mechanism.
If the system is synchronous, the proof follows directly from theorem 15. Otherwise, we prove
that the following reward mechanism is eventually fair. When starting the height H, the
correct validator for H do the following:
– Start the time-out for the reception of the messages from validators for the block H − 1;
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– Wait for receiving the messages from validators for the block H − 1 or the time-out to
expire. If the time-out expires before the reception of more that 2n/3 of the messages,
increase the time-out for the next time;
– Set to 1 the reward parameters for H−1 of the correct validators which messages where
received, and to 0 the merit parameters of the others;
– Reward only the validators for the height H − 1 which have a merit parameter different
than 0.
Since the system is eventually synchronous, eventually when the system will become syn-
chronous, the processes, in particular the validators for H will receive messages for all the
correct validators from round H − 1 before the round H. We note that the condition 3’ is a
weaker form of the condition 3 where we do not consider the beginning. So we end the proof
by applying the theorem 15 from the time when the system becomes synchronous.
• If there exists an eventual fair reward mechanism, then system is eventually synchronous or
synchronous.
If the reward mechanism is fair, by theorem 15, the communication is synchronous, which
ends the proof. Otherwise, since the reward mechanism is eventually fair, then there is a
point in time t from when all the rewards are correctly distributed. By considering t as the
beginning of our execution, then we have that the reward mechanism is fair after t, so by the
theorem 15, the system is synchronous from t. If the system were not synchronous before t,
that means that it is eventually synchronous, otherwise, it is synchronous. Which ends the
proof.
Theorem 16
Corollary 16.1. In an asynchronous system, there is no (eventual) fair reward mechanism, so if the
communication system is asynchronous, then there is no (eventual) fair Repeated Consensus-based
Blockchain protocol. Note that this result is valid even if all the processes are correct.
7 Conclusion
The first contribution of this paper is the improvement and the formal analysis of the original
Tendermint protocol, a PBFT-based repeated consensus protocol where the set of validators is
dynamic. Each improvement we introduce is motivated by bugs we discover in the original protocol.
A preliminary version of this paper has been reported in [2]. Very recently a new version of
Tendermint has been advertised in [7] by Tendermint foundation without an operational release.
The authors argue that their solution works if the two hypothesis below are verified: Hypothesis
1 : if a correct process receives some message m at time t, all correct processes will receive m
before max(t, global stabilization time) +∆. Note that this property called by the authors gossip
communication should be verified even though m has been sent by a Byzantine process. Hypothesis
2 : there exists eventually a proposer such that its proposed value will be accepted by all the other
correct processes. Moreover, the formal and complete correctness proof of this new protocol is still
an open issue (several not trivial bugs have been reported recently e.g. [41]).
Our second major contribution is the study of the fairness of the reward mechanism in repeated-
consensus blockchains. We proved that there exists a reward mechanism in repeated-consensus
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blockchains that is (eventually) fair if and only if the system communication is (eventually) syn-
chronous. In addition, we show that even if Tendermint protocol evolves in an eventual synchronous
setting, it is not eventually fair. However, it becomes eventually fair when timeouts are carefully
tuned, and under the assumption that commit messages contains enough information to distinguish
between correct and Byzantine processes in the synchronous period. Our study opens an interesting
future research direction related to the fairness of the selection mechanism in repeated-consensus
based blockchains.
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